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The introduction of the euro was one of the 
most important steps in the European 
integration process. The eurozone crisis has 
shown, however, that the EU’s Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) had several flaws in its 
design. Over the past years, an important reform 
process has taken place, which is likely to 
continue in the future. 
The question can be raised: “what does the 
future hold for the eurozone?” The answer to 
this question will depend to a large extent on the 
policy choices that will be made during the 
European Parliament’s 2014-2019 term. In this 
respect, the 2014 European elections will matter 
a great deal for the future shape and strength of 
the EMU. 
A wide range of possible reforms of the 
eurozone has been advocated since the outbreak 
of the sovereign debt crisis. Some are pessimistic 
about the ability of certain countries to recover 
from the crisis and advocate a eurozone break-
up, judging the common currency a failed 
experiment. More optimistic voices believe the 
eurozone should instead move forward, by 
mending its birth defects. Where most agree is 
that maintaining the architecture of the EMU in 
its present fragile state would leave it vulnerable 
to future crises. 
Besides calls for reforms to make the eurozone 
sustainable in the long-term, policymakers will 
also be faced with the need for short-term 
decisions to genuinely exit the ongoing crisis. 
Fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances will have 
to be addressed, and additional solidarity might 
be needed to cope with the severe social toll in 
the countries most hit by the crisis. Insufficient 
economic growth or renewed periods of crisis 
could complicate the situation even further. 
This Policy Brief discusses the 
challenges that await policymakers in 
reforming the EMU. A balance between 
discipline and solidarity will have to be 
found, while institutional reforms 
should improve the eurozone’s 
legitimacy and efficiency. The key 
decisions on EMU reforms will have to 
be made during the 2014-2019 
parliamentary term, as the window of 
opportunity for major reforms is likely 
to be closed afterwards. 
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Without doubt, any discussions on the reforms 
of the EMU are bound to be difficult for 
Member States and the European Parliament. In 
essence, European Council President Herman 
Van Rompuy identified the four building blocks 
around which the eurozone reforms will evolve, 
involving (i) financial, (ii) budgetary, (iii) 
economic and (iv) legitimacy and accountability 
reforms. These four building blocks provide a 
sense of direction with regard to the areas where 
reforms are needed. However, this approach 
does not necessarily highlight the underlying 
challenges that the reforms will face. In this 
respect, this paper identifies three crucial 
challenges for the upcoming reform of the 
EMU. 
The first two challenges relate to the substantive 
rules and instruments of the EMU (“what” the 
EMU is about). A first challenge is ensuring 
sufficient discipline in the conduct of policies 
that are of vital importance to the eurozone’s 
sustainability. This is to prevent the economic, 
fiscal and financial imbalances that occurred 
prior to the crisis. The discipline will likely have 
to be counterbalanced by solidarity across 
eurozone countries, which is the second 
challenge in the EMU reforms. Often, specific 
policymakers put the emphasis either on 
discipline or on solidarity. In reality, these two 
elements tend to be balanced against each other: 
discussions will have to consider both. 
Besides the “what” of the EMU, a properly 
functioning eurozone will also require 
addressing the “how” question. This boils down 
to defining how the EMU’s institutional 
functioning should be organised. Organising the 
EU’s legal and governance frameworks will be 
key in this respect, as well as defining the 
relation between the eurozone and the other 
Member States.  
In what follows, we will discuss each of the 
three challenges in turn. 
ENSURING DISCIPLINE 
A sustainable monetary union needs more than 
a mere common monetary policy. It notably 
requires sound fiscal and economic 
policymaking, as well as a stable financial sector. 
Prior to the crisis, these three policies were 
largely decided at the level of the individual 
Member States, with the EU having little ability 
to discipline national policymaking. As the 
eurozone crisis revealed substantial deficiencies 
in each of these policy fields, the European level 
had to strengthen its grip on all of them. Yet, 
the degree of European control differs from one 
policy field to another, resulting in distinct 
challenges for each of them over the 2014-2019 
parliamentary term. 
Public Finances 
The rules promoting discipline in public 
finances have traditionally been the most 
developed part of the EMU’s economic arm. A 
Stability and Growth Pact was put in place to 
regulate public finances. Even so, the rules were 
not able to prevent lax fiscal policies in several 
Member States. To counter this weakness, the 
eurozone’s fiscal rules have been considerably 
strengthened, inter alia, via the so-called six-pack 
and two-pack legislation packages and an 
intergovernmental treaty known as the Fiscal 
Compact. 
The degree of strictness and flexibility in the 
application of the fiscal rules will be a key issue 
during the next parliamentary term. It remains 
to be seen to what extent Member States will be 
willing to respect the pace and scale of 
envisaged fiscal consolidation. The response of 
the EU to deviations from fiscal objectives by a 
Member State will be closely watched. In 
essence, European policymakers will have to 
find a balance between two distinct approaches. 
They could, on the one hand, opt for a strict, 
mechanical application of the rules. This would 
offer the advantage of clarity, but a too rigid 
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application would undermine the legitimacy of 
the EU’s rules and actions. The alternative is a 
more flexible application of the EU fiscal rules. 
By considering the specific circumstances such 
an approach would allow for more economic 
and political judgement. The risk is, however, 
that this discretion might lead to the same laxity 
as was seen prior to the crisis. 
A similar balance will have to be found in terms 
of sanctions for the non-respect of the 
European rules. Applying a sanction would 
worsen a country’s fiscal problem, but the lack 
of sanctions as a possible stick would weaken 
the rules’ credibility. A potential way to 
overcome this predicament is to foresee positive 
incentives for troubled Member States to carry 
out the necessary reforms, making the sanctions 
part of a wider package (see the section on 
solidarity). 
As the EU’s framework of fiscal rules was put in 
place in the midst of a full scale sovereign debt 
crisis, Europe is likely to benefit from a review 
of its rules during calmer times. The envisaged 
assessment by 2018 of whether the Fiscal 
Compact should become an integral part of 
regular EU law offers a good opportunity for 
such an examination. The review can assess the 
fields in which a more flexible approach is 
warranted. A possible course of action in this 
sense is allowing for more attention for public 
investment when applying the EU fiscal rules – 
in line with the traditional meaning of the 
golden rule for fiscal policy. Alternatively, a 
review might result in increased European 
powers to discipline fiscal policies. While even 
stricter fiscal rules do not seem desirable, future 
reforms could give the EU more powers in the 
national budget making process. In this respect, 
the EU could potentially be given a veto right 
over draft national budgets. 
Economic Policy 
Before the crisis there was little willingness in 
the Member States to grant the EU a large role 
in economic policymaking, which was thus 
limited to surveillance and non-binding 
recommendations. The Europe 2020 Strategy, 
which replaced the Lisbon Strategy, is the 
cornerstone of this non-binding approach. The 
lack of more compulsory European control 
proved problematic, as large economic 
imbalances between eurozone countries 
emerged. 
As a consequence, several reforms were 
introduced to increase the EU’s role in 
economic policymaking. This notably led to the 
introduction of the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure. Despite this evolution, it still seems 
the EU lacks the instruments to compel a 
Member State to revise its economic policies at 
an early stage, i.e. before problems result in large 
economic weaknesses. During the next 
parliamentary term, a discussion is set to take 
place on a further strengthening of the EU’s role 
in economic policymaking. 
Some argue for endowing the EU level with its 
own economic policymaking powers. In 
ambitious views this would result in a 
“European economic government”. Inevitably, 
such increased European powers would limit to 
a large extent national sovereignty in economic 
policymaking and would have to be coupled 
with sufficient political legitimacy at the EU 
level. 
A somewhat less ambitious – but more likely – 
step in the direction of more European control 
may come from the introduction of “contractual 
arrangements” between the EU and each 
individual eurozone country. In such contracts, 
the EU and the Member State would agree on 
the economic reforms that a country will 
undertake in subsequent years. The EU’s aim is 
that the contractual nature of the document will 
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lead to higher compliance than is the case for 
the EU’s existing recommendations. 
Importantly, the contracts would be linked to a 
form of solidarity for countries that implement 
the agreed reforms. 
Beyond the question of the degree of control 
the EU should have on economic policy, a 
crucial question is the type of economic policies 
that the European level should actually 
advocate. The EU’s approach is at times 
criticised for being overly oriented on structural 
reforms and for insufficiently enforcing a 
symmetric adjustment involving not only the 
most vulnerable but also the most competitive 
eurozone countries. Others insist that the EU 
should pay more attention to social policies (see 
Frank Vandenbroucke, 2014). Economic policy 
is to a large extent determined by political 
choices. Hence, the outcome of the European 
and national elections can have a determining 
influence on the EU’s position with regard to 
economic policymaking. 
The Financial Sector 
Over the years, financial regulation has become 
largely determined at the EU level, even though 
national differences persist. The financial sector 
itself has increasingly transcended national 
borders. Supervision of the sector had not 
followed this trend, as it remained a national 
prerogative. The same holds true for the 
management of problems and crises in the 
financial sector. 
As for fiscal and economic policymaking, the 
eurozone crisis has demonstrated the 
weaknesses of this system. National supervisors 
paid insufficient attention to the inter-linkages in 
the European financial sector and cross-border 
supervisory cooperation was flawed. When 
problems occurred, the cost of bailing out banks 
proved very large for some Member States, 
leading to questions about their own solvency. 
This approach to financial supervision and crisis 
management will be radically altered with the 
launch of a European Banking Union. The 
European control over the financial sector will 
actually be stronger than its control over fiscal 
and economic policies. From November 2014 
onwards, a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
will be in place in which the eurozone and 
potentially other Member States will participate. 
Supervision of the banks in the SSM will be 
jointly exercised by the national supervisors and 
the European Central Bank (ECB), with the 
latter having the final say on supervisory 
decisions. In terms of crisis management, a 
similar system will be put in place through the 
creation of a Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM). 
In normal times, exercising these competences is 
essentially the responsibility of independent 
supervisors. Hence, it lies mostly outside of the 
hands of the European Parliament and national 
governments. The European co-legislators will 
nonetheless play an important role in the 
success of the Banking Union, as they are to 
provide an environment in which the project 
can be effective. 
The latter will require putting the necessary 
solidarity instruments in place (see infra). In 
addition, policymakers will have to work 
towards strong, harmonised rules for the 
banking sector. If the national rules differed 
considerably across Member States, the different 
legal frameworks would create tremendous 
complications for the work of the European 
level supervisory and crisis management 
authorities. As part of the regulatory response to 
the financial crisis, legislators will also have to 
deal with the structure of the banking sector and 
its too-big-to-fail problem. Finally, a timely 
review of the functioning of the Banking Union 
is called for during the 2014-2019 period. This 
will notably include assessing the interaction 
between the national supervisors and the ECB, 
  
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
5 
 
the Banking Union’s membership conditions for 
non-eurozone countries, as well as the envisaged 
crisis management procedures. 
PROVIDING SOLIDARITY 
The content and scope of solidarity instruments 
to consider for the EMU represents a second 
challenge for policymakers. As a complement to 
fiscal, economic and financial discipline, several 
measures implying the sharing of sovereign risks 
between eurozone countries will continue to be 
debated. Some solidarity mechanisms could 
bring partial relief to the public debt 
deleveraging process of the eurozone. Other 
instruments may facilitate the economic 
adjustment-process taking place in countries 
most badly hit by the crisis. More immediately, 
concrete steps involving solidarity are to be 
discussed in the setting-up of the Banking 
Union. 
Reducing Debt Levels beyond Austerity 
Eurozone policymakers developed several new 
instruments and policies to deal with the 
sovereign debt crisis. A European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) was created, which can 
provide loans to eurozone countries that are no 
longer able to access financial markets at 
affordable rates. The real turning point in the 
eurozone crisis, though, was the declaration by 
ECB President Mario Draghi over the summer 
of 2012 that the ECB would do “whatever it 
takes” to save the euro, and the subsequent 
introduction of the Outright Monetary 
Transaction (OMT) programme. Since then, 
sovereign yield spreads have considerably 
narrowed which led many to claim the eurozone 
debt crisis was effectively over. 
However, as the 2014 judgement of the German 
Constitutional Court on the OMT illustrated, 
the ECB intervention is still vehemently 
opposed in Germany, the eurozone’s largest 
economy. Critics of the ECB notably claim that 
the institution acts beyond its mandate by 
directly financing Member States, thereby 
providing illegal financial assistance and 
undermining discipline. The debate on the 
degree of risk sharing and solidarity necessary in 
the case of eurozone countries facing the risk of 
losing access to financial markets is hence far 
from conclusive, and will likely remain so in the 
years to come. Yet, given the extreme challenge 
that public debt reduction entails for many 
eurozone countries, repeated calls from the 
most distressed Member States for new 
arrangements involving solidarity are bound to 
continue. 
Discussions on what ought to be the role of the 
ECB in mitigating sovereign debt risks will 
remain central. Given the ECB’s independence 
and its mandate enshrined in the EU Treaties, 
the scope for steering monetary policy will be 
limited. Common debt emissions by the 
eurozone countries, dubbed “Eurobonds” in the 
past, may also come back to the forefront. Large 
scale projects for Eurobonds have been 
opposed by creditor countries, but perhaps 
smaller scale types of Eurobonds could be 
discussed. The conditionality and the type of 
support from the ESM will also be the focus of 
discussions if eurozone countries require help 
once again. In countries with high public debt, 
political and social forces pushing for radical 
ways of reducing their debt burden – i.e. debt 
restructuring or partial defaults – may gain 
ground in years to come. 
In a shorter time perspective, a more concrete 
issue will be the situation of countries still under 
a European bailout programme. Eurozone 
leaders will notably have to decide whether debt 
relief and new financial assistance should be 
granted to Greece. In this case, a so-called 
“Public Sector Involvement” would imply that 
past official loans from other eurozone 
countries are not entirely reimbursed, which de 
facto amounts to increased solidarity. 
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Economic Shock Absorption 
Numerous economists have argued that the 
single currency lacks a European-level 
mechanism to deal with “asymmetric economic 
shocks”, i.e. shocks that hit a specific part of the 
eurozone. A European shock absorption 
mechanism would allow to compensate for a 
part of the economic and social consequences in 
the countries that are hit the hardest by a crisis. 
A modest instrument to compensate for 
economic shocks will be on the table of 
policymakers as soon as the 2014-2019 term gets 
going. If the contractual arrangements discussed 
above would be introduced, they are to be 
accompanied by a “solidarity mechanism” that 
may involve grants or, less ambitiously, cheap 
loans to Member States. It is clear that this 
solidarity mechanism would be limited. It might 
compensate for some of the political and 
economic costs of carrying out reforms, but it 
would not be able to play a substantial role in 
dealing with large economic shocks. The 
solidarity attached to the contractual 
arrangements could, however, provide a step-up 
to a more sizable form of solidarity in the future.  
A genuine and sizeable economic shock 
absorption mechanism would allow for transfers 
between countries of the monetary union, for 
example to address differentials in economic 
output or unemployment owing to such shocks. 
Such an instrument requires a specific budget at 
the eurozone level. This eurozone budget 
should in principle be backed by a “fiscal 
capacity” (i.e. have its own revenues) and 
possibly be coupled with a borrowing capacity 
(i.e. the ability to issue common European debt). 
While a shock absorption mechanism might be 
advocated by several economists, politically it 
remains a very controversial issue. Behind the 
technicalities of the possible instruments, what 
is essentially at stake is the desirable scope of 
transfers within the EMU. Many fear that such 
transfers would become permanent despite 
claims of the contrary. Others believe transfers 
may be conceivable in a European Social Union 
(Vandenbroucke, 2014). 
Hence, any shock absorption mechanism 
involving major reforms could only be 
considered as a long-term prospect. A 
substantial step in this direction will remain 
controversial – and will require political 
sacrifices. Yet, without additional solidarity 
instruments in the EMU architecture, the 
emphasis will continue to lie on the fiscal and 
economic discipline of each individual Member 
State. As a result, all the burden of the 
adjustment is borne by the countries that are hit 
the hardest by a crisis. Limiting the support 
coming from the rest of the eurozone to loans 
in case of major financial distress may prove 
insufficient in the delicate balance to strike 
between discipline and solidarity in the EMU. 
Joint Management of Financial Crises  
After the 2014 elections, solidarity in the 
banking sector will be both a short-term and a 
long-term issue. In the short-term, an 
assessment by the ECB might detect weaknesses 
that cannot be addressed by a bank itself or the 
individual Member State in which the bank is 
based. In such a scenario, European solidarity 
would be required, most likely by making use of 
the European Stability Mechanism. 
Once the Banking Union is fully operational, the 
need for a common approach during financial 
crises will become even bigger. The reason is 
that the pooling of supervisory responsibilities 
implies that member countries of the Banking 
Union will also have to deal jointly with 
problems in their banking sector. This inevitably 
calls for long-term European solidarity, in the 
form of risk-sharing instruments. Three types of 
instruments will be discussed during the 2014-
2019 parliamentary term. 
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In the first place, a European resolution fund is 
to be financed by levies on the banking sector. A 
genuinely common European resolution fund 
will only be put in place over the course of 
several years. This slow pace and the relatively 
small size of the eventual fund are expected to 
be put under scrutiny during the years to come. 
While the new regulatory framework tries hard 
to prevent this, it might prove unavoidable that 
public money will be used to deal with a 
systemic bank crisis. That is why a second 
element in the debate on cross-border solidarity 
concerns the potential need for a European 
common public “backstop”. Such a backstop is 
to provide public financial resources for crisis 
management when no other realistic alternatives 
are left. The conditionality of this backstop, its 
size and the date of entry into force will all be 
major food for discussions. 
Finally, the question of an EU-level common 
deposit guarantee is likely to be raised in the 
future. The idea is that such a common 
guarantee would cover deposits in all Banking 
Union countries, replacing the existing national 
deposit guarantees schemes. It might contribute 
to financial stability by preventing massive bank 
runs in one specific country during a crisis. 
Despite its potential advantages, it is unsure 
whether the common deposit guarantee will be 
politically acceptable. While it would render the 
Banking Union more stable, it might also result 
in sizable transfers across national borders. 
MANAGING THE INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP 
After having discussed the balance between 
discipline and solidarity, we now turn to the 
question of how the functioning of the EMU 
should be organised. In dealing with the 
institutional issues of the EMU, two interlinked 
goals will have to be considered, namely the 
quests for efficiency and legitimacy of the EMU. 
In the past, policymakers would refer to the 
need for a “political union” to deal with these 
issues. As of 2014, there is more reluctance to 
call upon this concept. Instead people refer to 
the need for “accountability” in the EMU. The 
difference in semantics perhaps reflects a 
decreased willingness to take large steps in this 
field. The institutional question remains 
nonetheless crucial as it forms the basis that will 
enable the elements of discipline and solidarity 
in the EMU discussed above. 
A Eurozone Treaty? 
A first institutional issue that will probably be 
high on the agenda during the next legislative 
term revolves around the legal framework of the 
eurozone. An essential question is whether 
additional reforms should take place inside the 
EU’s legal framework or on an 
intergovernmental basis. Both forms have their 
own advantages and problems. Using the EU’s 
legal framework might involve changing the 
existing Treaties, implying a complex and 
hazardous decision-making procedure. In 
contrast, an intergovernmental approach that 
takes place outside the EU legal framework is 
easier to agree on. However, the latter procedure 
makes it more difficult to rely on the EU 
Institutions. In addition, intergovernmental 
Treaties are not allowed to override the EU’s 
own Treaties and thus do not offer a way 
around the EU Treaties’ limitations. 
As Philippe de Schoutheete (2014) describes, the 
widespread reluctance to Treaty changes seems 
to gradually make place for openness to 
reconsider the EU’s primary law. While still not 
certain to happen, this evolution makes Treaty 
modifications that revise the functioning of the 
eurozone a genuine possibility. Nonetheless, 
ensuring the ratification of a Treaty change in all 
Member States would be a most difficult 
endeavour. 
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When considering the scope of Treaty change 
for the eurozone, Member States basically have 
the choice between an extensive and a narrow 
approach. An extensive approach to Treaty 
reform would consist in reconsidering all Treaty 
articles relevant to the EMU. This allows for a 
structural modification of the eurozone’s 
functioning, but comes with high political risks 
as it would open Pandora’s box in terms of 
multiple and diverging national demands. In 
contrast, a Treaty reform with a narrower scope 
would involve only a limited set of amendments 
to Treaty articles. These amendments would 
concern specific Treaty obstacles, so as to open 
up the possibility for reforms that are desired by 
some. This might concern the full separation of 
bank supervision and monetary policy, the 
introduction of some form of Eurobonds, and a 
revision of the EMU’s corrective procedures. 
Such a narrow scope approach might be 
somewhat easier to implement, but it would not 
allow for a radical overhaul of the eurozone’s 
functioning – which is perhaps needed. 
Eurozone Specific Decision-making 
In terms of the reform of the EU institutions, 
the most important consideration for the EMU 
will likely be the extent to which a separate 
decision-making framework for the eurozone 
should be put in place. Linked to this question is 
the degree of involvement of the non-eurozone 
countries. Such differentiated decision-making, 
combined with closer economic integration of 
some Member States, would lead to a further 
increase in the EU’s multi-speed and multi-tier 
integration. Discussions on eurozone specific 
decision-making will have to take into account 
the specificities of each of the EU’s institutions. 
In the Council of Ministers and the European 
Council, a eurozone/non-eurozone separation 
has already occurred to a certain degree. With 
regard to the heads of state and governments, 
Euro Summits take place in addition to the 
ordinary European Council meetings. The 
Eurogroup only gathers eurozone finance 
ministers and functions as a body that informally 
prepares all Council decisions related to the 
eurozone. To increase the importance and 
efficiency of the Eurogroup, Germany and 
France are considering endowing it with a full-
time president based in Brussels. As the 
Eurogroup’s informal role is embedded in the 
Treaty, a formal decision-making role for the 
body would require changing the EU’s Treaty 
framework. 
In the European Parliament, there has been 
more resistance than in the Council to 
distinguish between eurozone and non-eurozone 
members. The cohesion of the Parliament is 
deemed to be at stake. At the same time it might 
make little sense to give to MEPs from the UK 
or Poland the same say on the eurozone as MEPs 
from the eurozone itself, which is the case 
today. Differentiation between general 
parliamentary activities and activities specific to 
the eurozone would almost certainly involve 
setting-up a eurozone subcommittee in the 
European Parliament. The precise design of 
such a eurozone committee would raise difficult 
questions, both with regard to the participation 
and the voting rights of non-eurozone countries. 
In the short-term, some steps towards a 
eurozone subcommittee could already take 
place. A legislative role for such a committee 
would, once again, require a Treaty change. 
With regard to the Commission, making a 
distinction between Commissioners that 
originate from a country from the eurozone and 
those from other Member States seems very 
unlikely. Alternative approaches may strengthen 
eurozone decision-making. One option is to 
merge the function of President of the 
Eurogroup with the position of Commissioner 
for EMU affairs. Another possibility is to have 
several “junior” Commissioners that are each 
responsible for a specific part of the EMU, with 
one “senior” Commissioner taking the lead on 
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EMU affairs. This latter option would 
simultaneously deal with the large number of 
Commissioners. 
For the European Central Bank, the key 
institutional reform would be to endow non-
eurozone countries with an equal say on 
decision-making on bank supervision as the 
eurozone countries. This would require a Treaty 
change. The same holds true for any 
modification to the institution’s monetary 
mandate. 
Transcending the EU level, the eurozone 
countries could also modify their role in 
decision-making in international organisations, 
such as the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Some argue that the eurozone countries 
should replace their individual national 
representations with common representation. 
Several eurozone countries, however, do not 
seem ready to give up their seat in these 
organisations. Closer collaboration between 
eurozone countries’ representations could be a 
compromise between these different views.  
Governance Procedures 
During the 2014-2019 parliamentary term, the 
economic governance procedures are expected 
to be scrutinised, including the procedures that 
have been put in place during the eurozone 
crisis. 
A key governance element that might face future 
parliamentary scrutiny is the procedure for 
economic and fiscal policy coordination, which 
is centred on the European Semester. The 
overall procedure is already seen by practitioners 
as highly demanding administratively. If the 
proposed contractual arrangements would 
simply be added to the existing procedures, this 
would further increase this complexity – 
potentially damaging effectiveness. Policymakers 
will therefore have to consider how new 
instruments can be integrated in current policy 
coordination without unduly increasing the 
administrative workload. In addition, a 
reduction of the yearly workload could consist 
in lifting some reporting requirements out of the 
European Semester and replacing them with 
multi-annual programming (in line with the 
contractual arrangements). The annual 
governance procedures could then focus on the 
most important economic adjustments. 
Besides the annual “regular” governance 
procedure, the crisis governance in case of 
bailout programmes for countries, involving the 
“Troika” (the ECB, the Commission and the 
IMF), might be revised. Some argue for a 
reduction of the role of the ECB in the bailout 
programmes, while others plead for the 
replacement of the existing European Stability 
Mechanism with a proper European Monetary 
Fund. The latter is meant to fully substitute the 
“Troika” with another governance structure to 
deal with bailout programmes. 
In terms of legitimacy and national ownership of 
the economic governance procedures, the 
involvement of the European parliament and its 
national counterparts could also be 
reconsidered. The role of the parliaments has 
for the most part been limited to legislative 
work, with little involvement from parliaments 
in the governance procedures. Different ways to 
improve their role can be considered, such as 
voting on EU recommendations and national 
commitments in the relevant parliaments. The 
evolution of the Inter-parliamentary Conference 
on Economic and Financial Governance, which 
brings together members of the European 
parliaments and of national parliaments in 
application of the Fiscal Compact, will be of 
particular relevance. However, increased 
involvement of parliaments will have to be 
balanced with the need to ensure the 
procedures’ efficiency. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Policy Brief discussed three challenges that 
await policymakers in their efforts to reform the 
eurozone: ensuring enough discipline, 
counterbalancing it with solidarity and 
enhancing the institutional workings of the 
eurozone. The challenges of discipline and 
solidarity are typically distinctively championed 
by different sides around the negotiating table. 
Yet, both discipline and solidarity are necessary 
for the eurozone to be successful. Therefore, 
discussions on the future of the EMU should 
not result in minimalist compromises. Instead, 
additional instruments ensuring discipline 
should necessarily be coupled with an increase 
in the scope of instruments for solidarity, and 
the other way around. 
The third and final challenge of the EMU 
consists in the establishment of a proper 
institutional framework for the eurozone. This is 
needed to provide the foundation for addressing 
the first two challenges. Some of the more 
ambitious reforms in terms of discipline and 
solidarity call for changes to the EU’s Treaty 
framework. In particular, the institutional 
organisation will need to ensure the legitimacy 
and efficiency of the EMU, which requires a 
reflection on the governance procedures and the 
degree of eurozone specific decision-making. 
By 2019, when the next European elections will 
be held, the debate in Europe will be very 
different from the current election debate. By 
then, the eurozone crisis may be conceived as 
something of the past. Unless a new similar 
crisis occurs, we cannot expect future politicians 
to have a particular sense of urgency in 
reforming the EMU. Hence, any envisaged 
comprehensive reform decisions for the EMU 
will have to occur during the 2014-2019 
parliamentary term. This should convince all 
political parties that will participate in the 
European elections of May 2014 to spell out 
their vision for the future of the eurozone. A 
crucial test awaits us in the next five years: 
turning ideas for the EMU into reality. If 
successful, the eurozone countries are likely to 
reap the benefits of the single currency. If not, 
they might once more face the consequences of 
its incomplete and fragile construction. 
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